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"NOTES
present statute have been omitted since they are merely repetitions of require-
ments of other statutes."8
AN ACT concerning survival of actions.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana.
SECTION 1. All causes of action shall survive and may be brought, not-
withstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to such action, by or
against the representative of the deceased person.
SEcTroN 2. Section 7 of Chapter 38 of the Acts of 1881 (Special Ses-
sion), and Section 2 of Chapter 292 of the Acts of 1937 are repealed.
SECTION 3. In addition to the sections specified in Section 2, all other
acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby.
repealed.
SECTION 4. Whereas an emergency exists for the immediate taking effect
of this Act, the same shall be in full force and effect from and after its
passage.
CHECK-OFF OF UNION DUES UNDER THE NLRA-.
A FEDERALLY PROTECTED.BARGAINING ISSUE
A frequently inserted clause in collective bargaining agreements states
that union membership dues shall be deducted from the wages of employees
and remitted by the employer to designated union officers.1  Although such
an arrangement constitutes a convenient, efficient method for the collection
of union dues, it may be unacceptable to an employer who assumes that this
is a matter about which he has no duty to bargain. Moreover, the dues"
check-off is the subject of a considerable measure of state regulation 2 -much
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-227 (Burns Repl. 1946).
1. See, e.g., the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, 25 LAB. REL. REP.
(Ref. Man.) 23 (1950). Such a provision is subject to the requirements of Taft-Hartley
section 302. See note 3 infra.
2. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has asserted that a dues check-off is pro-
hibited by that state's weekly wage payment law, and statute regulating the assignment of
future wages. Chabot v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 75 A.2d 317 (R.I. 1950) ; Shine
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 68 A.2d 379 (R.I. 1949). See R.I. LAWS 1947,
c. 1944, § 1. In Delaware check-off is by statute declared unlawful. DEL. LAWS 1947,
c. 196, § 4(b). In Georgia it is prohibited except on the individual request of employees,
revocable at will. GA. LAws 1947, No. 140, § 6. And in Iowa it is permitted only on
the employee's individual authorization, countersigned by his spouse, and revocable on
thirty days notice. IOWA CODE ANN. § 736A.5 (1946). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. tit.
81, § 202 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 97, § 94 (6) (1) (i) (Supp. 1950); N.H. LAWS
1947, c. 194, § 21; N.C. LAWS 1947, c. 328, § 5; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(1) (f)
(Supp. 1950); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11412.10 (Williams Supp. 1949); TEx. STAT., REv.
Civ. art. 5154e (1948) ; VA. LAws 1947, c. 2, § 5; Wis. STAT. § 111.06(1) (i) (1947).
The restriction on check-off is in most instances contained in a comprehensive code
of labor regulation. Pervading much of this state legislation, and apparently influencing
its character, is a design to elevate the rights and freedoms of the'individual worker. E.g.,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 736A.1 (1946), provides: "It is declared to be the policy of the state
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of which is more restrictive than the limitations imposed by Taft-Hartley
section 302. 3 Both refusal by employers to negotiate with employee represen-
tatives in respect to check-off agreements and their complete interdiction or
proscription except on conditions decreed by state legislation create areas of
conflict with the NLRA, if a federally protected right is involved."
The NLRA grants no specific entitlenaent to a dues check-off. But the
Act confers upon employees the right "to bargain collectively" ;4 and it is
stated in section 9(a) that this right may be exercised in respect to "rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."5
Since this section is construed to ensure to employees the right to negotiate
concerning every subject comprehended by its terms,' the crux is whether
it encompasses a check-off of union dues.
The phrase "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment" has never been generally interpreted. Congress in
- formulating the Wagner Act did not proffer a definition, and subsequent
attempts in Congress to particularize the scope of compulsory bargaining
have failed,7 leaving to the NLRB and the courts the task of deciding whether
of Iowa that no person within its boundaries shall be deprived of the right to work at
his chosen occupation for any employer because of membership in, affiliation with, with-
drawal or expulsion from, or refusal to join, any labor union, organization, or association,
and any contract which contravenes this policy is illegal and void." It is a fair conclusion
that this emphasis on individual prerogative is responsible for requirements that dues-
deductions be conditioned on the authorization of each employee. See generally Millis and
Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation, 15 U. OF CmI. L. Rxv. 282 (1947). How-
ever, it is difficult to justify the invalidation of check-off arrangements through applica-
tion of a wage assignment statute. See Shine v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
snpra. Such legislation clearly does not comprehend the deduction of union dues from
wages. Rather, its purpose is to protect employees against the temptation to surrender
anticipated wage payments for an inadequate consideration. See J. Greenebaum Tanning
Co., 10 WAR LAB. REP. 527 (1943) ; Little Steel Companies, 1 WAR LAB. REP. 325 (1942) ;
Braddom v. Three Point Coal Corp., 288 Ky. 754, 157 S.W.2d 349 (1941) ; International
Textbook Co. v. Weissinger, 160 Ind. 349, 65 N.E. 521 (1902).
3. Section 302 states that dues may be deducted from wages and paid to the union
only on the individual assignment of each employee, and the assignment may not be ir-
revocable for a period of more than one year or beyond the termination date of the
collective agreement. 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) and (c) (4) (Supp. 1950).
4. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1950).
5. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1946), unchanged by the Taft-Hartley
amendment, 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (Supp. 1950).
6. There is a persuasive argument that this portion of the Wagner Act was meant
to concern only organization for bargaining. However, the NLRB early assumed that
section 9(a) defines the scope of mandatory bargaining, and that is the accepted con-
struction today. Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National
Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 394-401 (1950). See Weyand, Majority
Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 CoL. L. REv. 556 (1945).
7. When the Taft-Hartley amendment was being formulated, it was proposed that
the scope of bargaining requirements be narrowed. Sen. Rep. No. 360, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947) (see note 8 infra) ; H.R. Rep. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
Contained in the House Bill, but not accepted by Congress, was a specific enumeration
of the subjects on which bargaining would be required. See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 49, 71 (1947). See also Note, 58 YALE L.J. 803, 806 (1949).
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a particular matter is included within the terms of the Act.' Neither the
Board nor the courts have ventured a predictive interpretation, and the result"
has been a case to case application of section 9(a). Such diverse subjects
as group insurance, company housing, grievances, the union shop, work
schedules, and plant rules have in this manner been declared to fall within
its sphere.9 To evolve a principle from the extensive array of asserted
bargainable issues seems a redoubtable task, for the Board has enunciated
no criteria for identifying subjects of mandatory bargaining. However,
there are frequent instances of significant language. For example, in
Woodside Cotton Mills Co.,"0 the employer had refused to bargain collectively
because he sought to retain as a prerogative of management the disposition
of questions concerning work standards and loads, shut-downs, and dis-
charges. These matters, the Board asserted, were "ordinarily considered
proper subjects for bargaining."" In Singer Mfg. Co.," paid holidays and
vacations were classified as "inatters which are generally the subject of col-
8. In the Senate Bill proposing an amendment to the Wagner Act in 1947 was a
provision which, it was felt by Chairman Herzog of the NLRB, would narrow the area
of mandatory bargaining. Commenting on this in a statement submitted to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, he said, "The appropriate scope of collective
bargaining cannot be defined in a phrase; it depends upon the industry's customs and
history, the previously existing employer-employee relationship, technological problems
and demands, and other factors. It may vary with changes in industrial structure and
practice. Our own xperience with the problem leads us to suggest that the matter be
left to the administrative discretion of those with skill and time to consider each problem
on its merits, subject to review by the courts." Hearings before Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S.f. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1914 (1947).
9. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1123 (1949) (group insurance);
Abbott Worsted Mills, 36 N.L.R.B. 545, 555-56 (1941), enforcement granted, 127 F.2d 438
(1st Cir. 1942) (company housing); U.S. Automatic Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 124, 133-34
(1944) (grievances) ; NLRB v. Winona Textile Mills, Inc., 160 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1947)
(the union shop) ; Wilson & Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 990, 999, enforcement granted, 115 F.2d
759 (8th Cir. 1940) (work schedules); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500,
518 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947) (plant
rules). See also Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 4, enforcement granted, 170 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1948) (pensions and retirement); Andrew Jergens Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 363, 365
(1948), enforcement granted, 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1949) (maintenance of membership) ;
Union Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 322, 324 (1948) (bonuses); National Grinding Wheel
Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905, 906 (1948) (rest and lunch periods) ; Hagy, Harrington & Marsh,
74 N.L.R.B. 1455, 1471 (1947) (re-employment of laid-off employees) ; J.I. Case Co., 71
N.L.R.B. 1145, 1148 (1946) (the closed shop); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B.
500, 518 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947) (sub-
contracting) ; J.H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377, 378 (1946), enforcement granted, 165
F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948) (merit increases) ; Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444, 470 (1940)
enforcement granted, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941) (paid holidays and vacations);
Washougal Woolen Mills, 23 N.L.R.B. 1, 10 (1940) (reinstatement of employees);
Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42, 54-55 (1940) (work loads, discharges, and
shut-downs).
10. 21 N.L.R.B. 42 (1940).
11. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42, 54 (1940). (Italics added.) See
Andrew Jergens Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 363, 365 (1948); National Grinding Wheel Co., 75
N.L.R.B. 905, 906 (1948) ; J. H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377, 378 (1946).
12. 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforcement granted, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
a
lective bargaining."13  And in Wilson & Co.' 4 the employer, it was held,
refused to bargain by unilaterally altering work schedules, one of the mat-
ters which "nornially are the subjects of collective bargaining."5
Such vague and gratuitous declarations cannot be termed an interpretation
of section 9(a). But reflection will disclose that the subjects declared bar-
gainable represent issues arising from the labor-management relationship
with which, it is generally recognized from tradition, experience, or notions
of policy, employees as a unit are intimately concerned.' 6 In this perspective,
the Board's assertions become conceptualistic expressions of the realm of
mandatory bargaining.
This thesis is confirmed by Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB.17  There the cen-
tral issue was whether pension and retirement plans are subjects of compul-
sory collective bargaining. Following substantially the reasoning of the
Board, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sustained the decision
that benefits flowing from a pension and retirement plan are both "wages"
and "conditions of employment." The court observed that there are many
issues arising from the employer-employee affiliation which, though not
specifically referred to in the Act, are normally recognized as included in its
bargaining requirements. And to the company's contention that pensions
and retirement were not generally in vogue when the Wagner Act was passed,
the court replied, "We do not believe that it was contemplated that the language
of section 9(a) was to remain static. Congress in the original as well as
in the Amended Act used general language, evidently designed to meet the
increasing problems arising from the employer-employee relationship ... "IS
Thus, it was expressly recognized that section 9(a) has no intrinsic definition,
that its terms are dynamic in application. 9 That in 1935 pension and retire-
ment proposals were not subjects of effective negotiation, as correctly asserted
by the company, is notably illustrative. For subsequent to enactment of the
Wagner Act, labor's interest in and public favor toward such employee security
13. Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444, 470 (1940). (Italics added.)
14. 19 N.L.R.B. 990, enforcement granted, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
15. Wilson & Co., 19 N.L.R.B.'990, 999-1000 (1940). (Italics added.)
16. E.g., the length of the working week has traditionally been a bargaining issue.
See LIEBERMAN, THE COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENT 124-28 (1939). Pension and re-
tirement benefits, on the other hand, have become a subject of effective negotiation only
recently, the culmination of a growing attempt to cope with the dangers of employee
insecurity. See Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 n.24 (1948) ; Rowe and Weiss, Benefit
Plans Under Collective Bargaining, 67 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 229-34 (Sept. 1948).
17. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), enforcing 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948).
18. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1948).
19. The court quoted approvingly, ibid., from Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910), where Mr. Justice McKenna stated, "Legislation, both statutory and consti-
tutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should
not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle
to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."
See W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
NOTES
measures mounted sharply. And by 1948 it was the natural assumption that a
primary function of the employee representative is the bargaining for and
acquisition of such benefits.2 0  Implicit in the Inland Steel decision, then,
is the tenet that section 9(a) is a generic category, encompassing the variant
issues created by the employment relationship which are at any time recog-
nized as vital to the principle of promoting the mutual interests of em-
ployees and management through collective bargaining.21
This concept of the area of compulsory bargaining easily comprehends
a dues check-ofif. A traditional issue in labor-management negotiation,2 2 the
check-off device is utilized on an extensive scale.23 Congress itself recog-
nized this when the regulations in Taft-Hartley section 302 were enacted.
And despite the limitations imposed by that Act, the practice of deducting
membership dues from wages expanded after its passage. 2  The principal
merit to a check-off plan arises from the stability of finance and membership
which it affords to the union. Representation disputes, an impediment to
plant operation, tend to assume less serious proportions since the position
of the union is strengthened, both over its own members and over rival
organizations.2 5 Moreover, individual dues solicitation by stewards or other
20. See note 16 supra.
21. So construed, section 9(a)- is a highly flexible device for defining the area of
compulsory bargaining. It is adaptable to "the industry's customs and history, the
previously existing employer-employee relationship, technological problems and demands,,
and other factors," as well as "changes in industrial structure and practice." See note 8
supra.
22. The check-off device had its inception in the last century in agreements between
the bituminous coal operators and the miners' union; and from these it spread to other
industries. See 30 MONTHLY LAB. Rzv. 1-5 (Jan. 1930).
23. Id. Before the Taft-Hartley Act was adopted, in 1946, about six million workers
-more than forty percent of all those under collective bargaining agreements-were
covered by some form of check-off. MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY 562 (1950). See LIEBERMAN, THE COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENT, 69-72
(1939).
24. MILLIS AND BROWN, op. cif. sutpra note 23, at 563, 635.
25. The existence of a voluntary check-off may be an important element in barring
a rival petition for certification filed during the term of a collective contract. Seeger
Refrigeration Co., 2 CCH LAB. LAW REP. ff 8635 (1949). A contract otherwise valid
as a bar to a rival petition does not preclude a present determination of representatives, if
the membership of the incumbent union has repudiated that organization and shifted to
another. News Syndicate Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1946); Olive & Meyers Mfg. Co., 59
N.L.R.B. 650 (1944); Illinois Gear & Machine Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 179 (1943). See Cin-
cinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 592, 602 (1949) (That the employer deducted dues
from wages of 55 out of 98 employees was a factor in establishing the majority status of
the union.) The War Labor Board, intent on maintaining uninterrupted production in
defense industries during World War II, quickly recognized the check-off arrangement
as an element of peaceful labor relations. See, e.g., Little Steel Companies, 1 WAR LAB.
REP. 325 (1942).
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union officials, which so often interferes with shop routine, is avoided by
this salutary arrangement. 6
A theory that section 9(a) does not include check-off is expounded in
Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB.17  The United Steelworkers (C.I.O.) were
certified as bargaining representative of the employees of the Hughes Tool
Company. But the company granted a check-off privilege to a minority
union, and in addition permitted the minority union to represent its members
in the adjustment of their grievances. A request by the Steelworkers that
these practices be discontinued was refused, and a complaint was registered
with the NLRB. It was determined that the company had, by these acts,
refused to bargain with the Steelworkers as the exclusive representative of its
employees, and a cease and desist order was issued. The Board expressly
reasoned that since the deduction of dues is a proper subject for collective
bargaining, the granting of a check-off privilege to a minority organization
derogates from the exclusive representative status of the majority union 8
But there was a failure to recognize that although the certified bargaining
representative acts in behalf of all employees in the unit, it is impossible for
one organization to bargain in respect to the deduction of dues from wages
of employees belonging to another. For in one sense a check-off device con-
cerns the administration of internal union affairs, viz., the financial relation-
ship between a member and his organization. The certified union has no
function arising from its position as exclusive bargaining agency to inquire
into the manner in which a minority group collects its dues. Therefore, that
the employer is required to negotiate concerning the granting of check-off to
the certified bargaining representative does not force the conclusion that he
cannot, by agreement with a minority union, extend to it this privilege; for the
bargaining prerogative of the representative organization is not thereby im-
paired. A better reasoned basis for denying to the employer this authority
might lie in the notion that by checking off dues for a minority union, he is sup-
porting an organization rivaling the one chosen by a majority of his employees.29
26. In a case before the War Labor Board, adoption of check-off was directed after
the employer requested it on the ground that it would minimize interference with produc-
tion resulting from collection of dues by shop stewards. Ip re Hamilton Watch Co., 27
WAR LAB. REP. 9 (1945). Retail employers have in general found that deducting dues
from wages is preferable to collection by union officials, for the reason that grievances
tend to multiply when dues are solicited. KIRSTEIN, STORES AND UNIONS 169-70 (1950).
27. 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945), enforcing in part, 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944).
28. The Board accepted the trial examiner's stated reasoning concerning the dispute
over check-off. 56 N.L.R.B. 981.
29. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate, interfere with, or
contribute support to any labor organization. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(2)
(1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(2) (Supp. 1950). In his
stated conclusions in the Hughes case, the trial examiner apparently recognized that the
deduction of dues was a valuable aid to the minority union, but he failed to follow this
approach to the controversy. 56 N.L.R.B. at 995. It is interesting to note that the
minority union had been the bargaining agency prior to certification of the Steelworkers;
NOTES
The reviewing court in the Hughes case, in setting aside that part of the
order relating to check-off, was misguided by the same error which *deceived
the Board. For it likewise assumed that if the employer is required to
negotiate with the certified bargaining representative in respect to a check-off
plan, an agreement'with a minority group to deduct from wages the dues of
its members would encroach upon the position of the bargaining agency as
exclusive representative. Therefore, to support its holding that the employer
could not be required to cease checking off dues for the minority union, the
court declared, "The collection of dues by a union from its members is not in its
nature a matter for collective bargaining, which by the Act is limited to agree-
ing with the employer on rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment.... What the Company is doing in this regard is not
a refusal to bargain with the Steelworkers.""0 Reaching an opposite result but
with the illogic which misled the Board, the court unnecessarily adopted the un-
tenable position that a dues check-off is not encompassed by section 9(a).
NLRA Section 7 confers on employees the right to bargain collectively. 3'
Accepting the premise that this comprehends negotiation concerning a check-
off arrangement, it follows that state legislation curtailing the exercise of
this right is inconsistent with the federal Act, and therefore unconstitutional
by virtue of the supremacy clause. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
considered the inviolability of the right to a dues check-off, other rights have
been carefully guarded against state infringement by decisions effectually
declaring that the states have no function to regulate in this area."2  Amalga-
mnated Ass'n. v. Tflisconsin Employment Relations Board,33 the Supreme Court
decision holding unconstitutional the Wisconsin public utility anti-strike law,
is illustrative. Congress, it was noted, expressly guaranteed to employees
the right to engage in concerted activities. This grant could not be construed
to permit state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages ;34 therefore,
and during this period the company had accorded to the Steelworkers, then in the minority,
the same privileges in respect to check-off and grievance procedure as were in dispute
in this case. Whether those privileges may have been an element in promoting the sub-
sequent change in bargaining representatives is not disclosed by the opinion.
30. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 74-75 (5th Cir. 1945).
31. Section 7 states, "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form.
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities . . . and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities. . . ." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.§ 157 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1950).
32. See International Union of United Auto Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454
(1950); Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U.S.
953 (1950) ; La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 18 (1949) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767
(1947) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). An excellent article discussing the prob-
lem of accommodating state and federal labor legislation in this area is Cox and Seidman,
Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. Rav. 211 (1950).
33. 71 Sup. Ct. 359 (1951).
34. Section 7 leaves open the problem of defining the "concerted activities" which
the states may not restrict. See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26
IND. L. J. 319 (1951).
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"Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation." The tenor
of the Court's attitude toward state interference with Section 7 is further
disclosed by the significant assertion, "It would be sufficient to state that the
Wisconsin Act, in forbidding peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries
covered by the Federal Act, has forbidden the exercise of rights protected
by section 7 of the Federal Act." 6 Finally, the decision clearly illustrates that
a state may not restrict the scope of mandatory bargaining." An effect of the
Wisconsin Act in this case was to impose compulsory arbitration of a dispute
concerning work schedules. The Court observed that work scheduling is a mat-
ter about which the employer is required to bargain under section 9(a). Ac-
cordingly, state legislation relieving him of this duty could not be sustained, for
it would effectually deprive employees of a federally protected bargaining
right. 8
Congress has guaranteed to employees the right to bargain collectively in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment. The deduction of union membership dues from wages is tradi-
tionally a subject of collective bargaining, and is a matter appropriately
encompassed by NLRA section 9(a). Therefore, an employer may not
refuse to negotiate with the representative of his employees concerning a
check-off plan. And the bargaining right accordingly granted to employees
nay not be abridged by state regulation.
35. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 71 Sup. Ct. 359,
363 (1951). The Court here relied on International Union of United Auto Workers v.
O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950), a decision holding unconstitutional a Michigan strike
control law. Aside from the observation that the right to engage in concerted activities
was safeguarded for employees in the federal Act, it was further noted that Congress
imposed, in NLRA section 8(b), certain qualifications on the exercise of that right,
thereby pre-empting this area of employee activity. This reasoning points up a specific
analogy between the right to engage in concerted activities, and the right to bargain in
respect to a dues check-off. For the conditions on which union dues may be deducted
from wages were expressly decreed by Congress in Taft-Hartley section 302. See note
3 supra. It is a fair conclusion that for this reason check-off is closed to state regulation.
In marked contrast is the express grant to the states of authority to prohibit union secur-
ity agreements, notwithstanding that such agreements are included within the scope of
Taft-Hartley section 9(a). See note 37 infra.
36. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 71 Sup. Ct. 359,
367 (1951). See id. at 363 n.12.
37. Although union security agreements are a subject of mandatory bargaining, see
Andrew Jergens Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 363 (1948), they may be prohibited by state regulation
under authority granted by Taft-Hartley section 14(b). Professor Cox and Mr. Seidman,
commenting on the problem of determining the extent to which a state may regulate the
terms of a bargaining agreement, propose this formula: "The test, we suggest, is whether'
the state law regulates labor relations in order to adjust the conflicts of interest between
employers and employees or seeks to protect other interests which the state deems para-
mount and whose advancement only collaterally affects issues of labor policy." Cox
and Seidman, supra note 32, at 242.
38. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 71 Sup. Ct. 359,
367-68 (1951).
